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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEES/CROSS-APPEUANTS 
INTRODUCTION 
This case involves issues on the appeal and cross-appeal which are closely related. 
Specifically, Richards claimed that the trial court erroneously awarded him insufficient 
attorney fees and that he is entitled to more. On the cross-appeal, Brown asserted, in part, 
that the trial court should not have awarded Richards any attorney fees because he failed to 
present sufficient evidence of fees on remand as required by this Court. In his 
reply/response brief, Richards addresses both issues under the guise of a "reply." In this 
brief, Brown will follow the format of Points I through VI of his opening brief on the cross-
appeal rather than attempting to parallel Richards1 unusual format.1,2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RICHARDS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED ANY 
ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING 
HIS FEE APPLICATION DID NOT MEET THE 
REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY THIS COURT. 
In the initial opinion in this case the court reversed the trial court on the issue of 
Richards' attorney fees.3 Brown v. Richards. 840 P.2d 143, 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The 
court held that the trial court's findings on the issue of Richards' attorney fees were 
jRichards does not respond to Point VII of Brown's opening brief on the cross-appeal. 
There Brown maintained that he is entitled to attorney fees on this appeal should this Court 
either sustain the trial court's reduced fee award to Richards or determine that Richards is 
entided to no fees. Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 33. By not responding to this 
issue, Richards apparendy concedes its validity. 
^ h i s brief will make references to Richards' reply/response brief where possible. 
3Brown's attorney fees were not appealed. 
inadequate to support the award. The court of appeals' opinion dictated Richards' burden 
on remand: 
On remand, Richards 
must set out the time and fees expended for (1) successful claims for 
which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful 
claims for which there would have been an entitlement to attorney fees 
had this claim been successful, and (3) claims for which there is no 
entitlement to attorney fees. 
Cottonwood Mall. 830 P.2d at 269-70. The trial court's finding should then 
mirror the foregoing categories so that they may be reviewable. 
Brown, 840 P.2d at 156 n.12.4 As the court of appeals noted, these criteria were taken from 
the Utah Supreme Court case Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine. 830 P.2d 266, 269-270 (Utah 
1992). Because Richards failed to make the allocations required by this Court, the trial court 
erred because its findings do not "mirror the foregoing categories" and thus, the award of 
any specific amount was erroneous. 
At the outset of this argument, Brown wishes to emphasi2e two critical points. First, 
Brown is not claiming that Richards is not entitled to attorney fees under the contract. In 
fact, Brown admits that Richards is entitled to attorney fees under the contract for the breach 
of warranty claim. This claim, but only this claim, falls within the category "successful claims 
4Richards claims that Brown "never submitted any affirmative evidence which 
challenged Richards' fee allocation." Richards' Reply/Response Brief at 1. This claim is 
wrong for two reasons. First, the court of appeals placed the burden squarely on Richards 
to present his conforming fee allocation. Richards has yet to meet that burden. Second, the 
claim ignores years of challenges to Richards' "allocation" before the trial court (R. 4967-
5000; 5066-94), ignores his attorneys' own affirmative admissions of non-compliance (see, 
e.g., p. 4 herein) and ignores George Naegle's testimony which affirmatively established the 
decline of "block billing" at a time Richards' attorneys continued to embrace it (see p. 6. 
herein). Curiously, other points in Richards' own brief discuss Brown's "challenges" to 
Richards' allocation. See, e.g.. Richards' Reply/Response Brief at 5-6 n.2. 
2 
for which there may have been an entitlement to attorney fees." Second, Brown is arguing, 
both in his initial brief and here, that because Richards refused to provide evidence and make 
the allocations mandated by this Court, he failed to meet the burden imposed by this Court. 
Therefore, Richards should not receive any award of fees because he did not follow 
the mandate of the court. An award of fees to Richards should not be based on sympathy 
or a comparison to Brown's fees, which the trial court did. (R. 5877-78) The trial court was 
apparently swayed by the facts that Richards' attorneys did a lot of work and Brown received 
some attorney fees. Neither of these reasons falls within this Court's criteria. Richards' fee 
request must be measured against the three criteria mandated. Using this measurement, 
Richards' fee request fails completely. Richards' ill-disguised attempt to transform a myriad 
of non-compensable fees into compensable fees on the back of the single compensable claim 
illustrates the need for this Court to enforce its original position. 
In his reply, Richards claims: (1) he allocated his fees (Richards' Point IA), (2) he is 
entitled to fees for the "fraud defense" and because of overlap in the evidence (Richards' 
Points IB and IC), and (3) that Brown conceded that the trial court's findings were 
inadequate (Richards' Point IIC). Those erroneous claims will be addressed in order. 
A. Richards did not allocate attorney fees as directed by this Court. 
Richards boldly asserts that he complied with this Court's remand order requiring 
allocation of his attorney fees. The facts simply do not support this claim. Richards can 
point to no place in the record where he made the allocations required by this Court. 
Brown does not dispute the claim that Richards subdivided his attorney fees into 
fourteen categories. Nor does Brown dispute the fact that Richards made some minor 
3 
reductions in his fee request, based on arbitrary percentages. However, this Court did not 
require Richards to subdivide his fee request into fourteen parts; this Court required Richards' 
fee request be divided into three simple parts. None of the fourteen categories in Richards' 
fee request is labeled "successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney 
fees." None of the categories is labeled "unsuccessful claims for which there would have 
been an entidement to attorney fees had this claim been successful." None of the categories 
is labeled "claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees." Richards' fourteen 
categories are camouflage to hide the fact that he cannot allocate his fees as required.5 It is 
significant that Richards1 response avoids any rejoinder to the recital of fatal admissions by 
his attorneys, e.g. that they did not allocate fees to unsuccessful claims (R. 6050, p. 240), or 
to an unsuccessful contract defense (R. 6050, p. 236), yet sought fees for unsuccessful 
rescission claims (R. 5225). See, generally, Brown's first Brief, pp. 5-6 and 14-16. 
^ h e fourteen categories into which Richards divides his fee request are: 
1. Factual development and discovery scheduling 
2. Preparation of answer and counterclaim 
3. Plaintiffs' discovery 
4. Defendants' discovery 
5. Plaintiffs' pretrial motions 
6. Damages 
7. Defendants' pretrial motions 
8. Jury instructions and special interrogatories 
9. General trial preparation 
10. Preparation of judgment and related issues 
11. Post-judgment motions 
12. Petition for writ of mandamus 
13. Negotiation for sale of Interwest and other 
14. Attorney fees 
Addendum of Richards' response brief, R. 5117-5156. 
4 
Richards5 failure to allocate his fees into the three required categories was plain to the 
trial court. The trial court found Richards1 "proofs presented at the remand hearing were 
admittedly not in conformity with the remand instructions . . .." (R. 5707) The court also 
found: 
3. Defendants' counsel did not allocate time based on individual claims 
because of the impracticality of doing so. It would be difficult if not 
impossible in many instances to know how efforts made might relate to one 
claim or another. There was an overlapping of the warranty evidence and the 
fraud evidence such that one could not allocate the time expended to one 
claim or the other with any degree of precision. The entries in the billing of 
defendants' counsel are like those of counsel for plaintiffs, quite general and 
vague. 
(R. 5878) 
The trial court's findings substantiate Brown's assertion that the evidence presented 
by Richards did not meet the requirements imposed by this Court.6 The trial court attempted 
to excuse Richards' failure by parroting the claim that overlapping evidence between the non-
compensable fraud claim and the compensable breach of warranty claim somehow prevented 
the type of accounting which this Court mandated. However, neither the facts nor the law 
support that notion. 
The facts of this case, as given by Richards* own lead counsel, dispel the notion that 
an inadequate allocation should be excused. Richards' attorneys admitted they knew from 
the outset that Richards' case involved both contract and tort claims and that the attorney 
fees for tort claims were non-compensable. (R. 6049 at 22-23) Additionally, Richards' 
6Yet Richards mistakenly characterizes Brown's argument as "frivolous and even 
sanctionable." Richards' Reply/Response Brief at 5. 
5 
attorneys knew the law concerning attorney fees. As noted in Brown's first brief, they knew 
the standards for award of attorney fees in Utah (R. 6049 at 19-20), and they knew that no 
recovery of attorney fees was available for tort claims. (R. 6049 at 106) Despite their 
knowledge of the facts and the law, Richards' attorneys never kept track of time by specific 
claim (R. 6049 at 40) and those working on the case never even discussed whether time 
recorded on their time sheets should be allocated between the compensable breach claim and 
the non-compensable fraud claim. (R. 6049 at 87) Thus, the evidence shows that the 
attorneys purposely followed a course of conduct which prevented an adequate accounting 
of their fees, contrary to Utah law. 
The trial court found that Richards' attorneys engaged in "block billing," a practice 
where all of the time spent in any one day on a client's case is billed as one block of time 
and no separate allocation is made among individual claims, whether they are compensable 
or not. (R. 5709) However, these same attorneys also represented insurance companies, which 
were prohibiting "block billing." (R. 6049, p. 73-74; R. 6050, p. 281-287) The underlying time 
sheets, never made available to the trial court, also made no allocation among the variety of 
claims which Richards pursued. Therefore, Richards' attorneys could not separate work on 
the compensable breach claim from the non-compensable fraud and misrepresentation claims, 
which the trial court found formed the bulk of Richards' case. (R. 5553, p.6-7) 
Richards' attorneys claimed adherence to the time keeping required to make the 
allocations would have been "impractical." However, such time keeping would not have been 
difficult. Richards' lead attorney acknowledged to the jury that "the warranty doesn't turn 
or depend upon the motive or intention or even good faith, of the representation." (R. 4226, 
6 
p. 5081) This difference could easily have served as the bright line for time keeping by the 
attorneys. Any time that involved Brown's motive, intent or good faith could have been 
recorded separately. That this easily-understood distinction in time keeping was ignored 
underscores the attorneys' stated intent to claim all fees, regardless of any award for breach 
of warranty (R. 5227-8). 
Due to Richards' attorneys' conscious disregard of the law, and in light of the facts 
and findings of the trial court which demonstrate that the evidence supporting Richards' fee 
application did not satisfy the requirements imposed by this Court, Richards should have 
been awarded no attorney fees. 
B. Richards is not entided to fees other than those incurred for the breach of warranty 
claim, but only if proof of those fees satisfied this Court's requirements. 
In his response Richards continues to raise the argument which he made in the trial 
court-that he his entitled to attorney fees because of the overlap in proof between the non-
compensable fraud claim and the compensable breach of warranty claim. This argument 
takes two, slightly different forms. First, Richards claims that he is entitled to fees for his 
"fraud defense" to Brown's claims. (Richards' Reply/Response Brief, Point IB at 6-7) 
Second, Richards claims that he is entitled to fees for fraud because of the overlap between 
the fraud and breach of warranty claims. ( Id-, at 8-10) Both of these variations of the 
argument are contrary to the facts and the law. 
With respect to the so-called "fraud defense," Richards incredibly states: 
This Court clearly held in Brown L 840 P.2d at 150, that Richards relied on 
the 'fraud defense' as part of the 'substantial performance defense' in prevailing 
against Brown's Interwest contract claim. Accordingly, Richards was entitled 
to fees for proving his fraud defense. Brown L 840 P.2d at 150, 154. 
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(Jd., at 6-7) Richards makes it sound as if this Court ruled that he was entitled to attorney 
fees for the "fraud defense." But this Court made no such ruling. An examination of the 
pages cited by Richards reveals that the court mentioned Richards' "fraud defense," but 
never held that Richards was entitled to fees for it. 
Richards also makes the startling argument that Brown is foreclosed from raising the 
issue of Richards' entidement to fees for the "fraud defense" on this appeal. (Id., at 7) In 
support of this unusual claim, Richards cites several portions of the record and concludes 
that Brown did not object at trial and therefore, should be precluded from raising the issue 
on appeal. In fact, the portions of the record cited by Richards all concern his "fraud 
defense" not the award of attorney fees for the "fraud defense." This appeal is not about 
the validity of the "fraud defense" but rather the invalidity of an award of unallocated and 
unproven attorney fees for the "fraud defense." 
The way in which Richards presented his case to the jury also reveals that the 
"overlapping issues" argument is now advanced by Richards solely as a method to obtain 
fees for the fraud claim. Richards* initial counterclaim sought tort recovery, as did each 
subsequent amendment. Richards' case was filled with tort issues and evidence. Almost 
every witness called by Richards or cross-examined by Richards was asked tort-related 
questions. As the trial court found, 
The theme of Richards1 case was fraud. Defendant's counsel carried that claim 
to the jury by clear and convincing evidence by far the greater quantity of 
evidence and the greater number of witnesses supported negligent 
misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. The result of the expenditure 
of time, efforts and expenses are clearly mirrored in the juryfs verdict. 
8 
(R. 5879). In his claim for fees, Richards failed to delineate the elements of the breach of 
warranty claim and the distinct elements of the fraud and misrepresentation claims. "Unlike 
liability for negligence, which is based on fault, breach of warranty sounds in strict liability." 
Groen v. Tri-O-Inc. 667 P.2d 598, 604 (Utah 1983). On remand, Richards should have, but 
did not, factor into his fee request which portion of his trial evidence would not have been 
admitted but for the claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation. 
Because Richards was unable to meet his burden of separating his warranty-related 
fees from fees for his other claims, the trial court was required to examine Richards* 
counterclaim to determine what proof he was able to present that would not have been 
admitted on the breach of warranty claim alone. Because Richards failed to allocate fees, the 
trial court was required to quantify which of the tort and non-asset contract evidence was not 
linked to a specific decrease in value in order to qualify for benefit of the bargain damages. 
Richards argues that the factual issues of warranty and fraud overlap and that he is entitled 
to recover fees under the contract for the commonality of some facts, ignoring the separate 
elements of each and the separate burdens of proof. However, in answering the special 
interrogatories, the jury found that benefit of the bargain damages, even though available, 
were not appropriate for the warranty claims. (R. 2820) Simply put, Richards may not 
recover contract fees for a simple contract issue following a successful fraud case unless the 
fees requested are separately identified and appropriate to only the simple contract issue. 
Because most of Richards' trial evidence was not tied to any sort of damages, that 
evidence had absolutely nothing to do with the contractual claims and all the fees incurred 
in developing and presenting it should have been excluded by Richards from the fee 
9 
calculation. Richards' claim concerning overlap of the fraud and breach of warranty claims 
ignores the fact that it was he who refused to allocate attorney time spent on compensable 
claims, non-compensable claims, and unsuccessful claims. Had this required allocation been 
made the trial court's conclusion would have been far more accurate and reviewable as 
mandated by this Court. However, because Richards failed to make the allocations, the trial 
court should not have attempted its own allocations by relying on whatever categorization 
Richards chose to provide. Rather, the trial court should have followed this Court's mandate 
and disallowed all of Richards' attorney fees because of the insufficiency of the allocations. 
C. Richards misconstrues Brown's claim of error by the trial court. 
In Point IIC of his response brief, Richards argues that Brown concedes the 
inadequacy of the trial court's findings on fees. (Richards' Reply/Response Brief at 13-15) 
This argument misperceives Brown's position. On the cross-appeal, Brown argued that the 
trial court abused its discretion in awarding any attorney fees to Richards, while in response 
to the issue raised by Richards, Brown asserted that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in the amount of attorney fees awarded to Richards. These positions are not inconsistent. 
In fact, the argument raised by Brown concerning the adequacy of Richards' evidence is a 
threshold to the argument made by Richards. If Brown's position is accepted, any 
consideration of the fees claimed by Richards is precluded. 
Brown's position on this point is based on this Court's statement in Redevelopment 
Agency v. Daskalas. 785 P.2d 1112, 1126 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). There, the court stated, "an 
award [of attorney fees] made without adequate supporting evidence constitutes an abuse of 
discretion and must be overruled." Brown maintains the trial court abused its discretion 
10 
becai is< : it award< M 1 .1 • LJ fi , 1 <i ' :-\] • ' ' - . a t e his fees as 
required by this Courr. < in the other hand, if the court concludes that Richards did n<)t have 
to allocate hi., i^ch «;^: ;lt. ^\;a^nce was minimally sufficient,. Brown maintains that the 
#".'•'••- • * '•"• 1^  ' . iw.ivi! ,! -v . discretion, given Richards' 
fractured evidence and a trial court 's discretion to determine fees. 
As noted in Brown's first briei,
 t\\ \\ . _ , . . , ian courts require attorneys w h o seek 
f e e -si s - l v . < , , 1/ * 1 " - ;^ , *^i •• i 
claimed fees from work performed on non-fee issues. See Cottonwood Mall, 830 P.2d at 269; 
Baldwin v. Burton. 850 P.2d 1188, 1199 (Utah 1993); Graco Fishing & Rental Tools . Inc. v. 
I r o n w o o d Explorat ion. iIJJL__ • -v. r - ,* * -^ . .-uw ^ q c i i c r i w . >. ^ ^ I I L 
Valley Dairy Ass'n.. 657 P.2d 1279, 1288 (Utah 1982). A trial court that awards attorney fees 
based on inadequate evidence abuses its discretion, Redevelopment Agency. 785 P.2d at 
1 
This Court noted in Brown that this was a complex matter involving the adjudication 
o f multiple claims arising under several contracts with each party winning on some issues and 
losing on some issues In vacating and remanding for recalci llation ::: i Ft ichards* fees, th is 
Court specifically noted that the trial court 's previous findings did no t "indicate what work 
was actually performed in relation to the contractual claims upon which Richards prevailed 
and that it was necessary," and stated that Richards mus t separate ;v, /.:.• IL I - a . .-. >rcui£ 
t< wrionwv-wu . :ai. • . ^ i- k i d at 156 n.12. Richards simply has no t done that. 
Richards argues that Brown has conceded the insufficiency of the trial court's findings. 
Brown does n o t concede that the trial court ^ findings are insufficient. Rather, Brown asserts 
that the trial court should have simply stopped when it found that Richards' "proofs 
presented at the remand hearing were admittedly not in conformity with the remand 
instructions . . .." (R.5707) At that point the trial court should not have attempted an 
allocation but should have simply concluded that the nonconformity prevented Richards from 
recovering any attorney fees despite his entidement. However, except for this initial error 
by the trial court, Brown contends that the trial court's subsequent findings were sufficient. 
In support of his erroneous assertion, Richards cites Selvage v. J J. Johnson & 
Assocs.. 910 P.2d 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), in an effort to demonstrate the alleged 
insufficiency of the trial court's findings. Richards' Reply/Response Brief at 13-14. Richards 
fails to disclose that Selvage really supports Brown's position. In Selvage, a creditor brought 
claims against a transferee under both multiple contracts and the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act (UFTA). Id, at 1256. The creditor prevailed under both the contract and 
UFTA theories and his attorney submitted an affidavit in support of an application for 
attorney fees. The attorney did not allocate his fees into the three Cottonwood Mall 
categories but rather simply attached billing records to the affidavit. Id, The trial court 
awarded attorney fees under provisions in the contracts but reduced the amount from the 
requested $175,000 to $42,500. Id at 1257. Most importandy, the trial court's findings on 
the fee issue identified only four factors which were considered in the award of the creditor's 
fees. I d Only the creditor appealed the attorney fee issue. 
This Court's holding in Selvage has particular application in this case. The court 
there held that the issue of attorney fees should be remanded for entry of more findings 
which would support the amount of the original award. LdL at 1266. However, before 
12 
reaching this conclusion, this Court stated that the creditor was not entided to attorney fees 
incurred in pursuit of the non-contract, fraud claims. Id. at 1264. Further, the court did not 
address the issue rai:,c .;. ;.^- transferee concerning the propriety 01 ;:u .:t:.:: ^ u n : i :^ e:> 
d i* .* ~'^* * -1' •* allocate fees into the three Cottonwood Mall categories. 
Selvage. 91 (J P.2d at 1260 n I ^ However, the court stated that it may be proper for a trial 
court to deny a request for attorney fees "if the requesting party fails to allocate in accord 
w ith the d i rective c f Cottonswua AI„. ' . . •:•. •• . -:• the 
adequacy of the trial court's findings. Despite Richards' claims to the contrary, the findings 
in that case, which were not recited in the court's opinion, appeared to be much less detailed 
than the findings entered b \ the tria 1 • :oi :i i:t it i th is ::as ::: 
D. Richards9 position is not supported by the case law. 
In his response brief, Richards cites very few cases in support of his claim that his 
allocation was satisfactory , albeit non c snforming. L kkl itiona] 1') R ichards refuses to d isci iss 
the leading Utah cases on the issue of attorney fees. Those cases support Brown's position 
that Richards' failure to allocate fees precluded any award of fees. 
Even the most recent case from tl le Utah Supreme < • .ir*. suppor- n* A\? ; ••-,-• 
In Foote v. Clark. 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998), the court reviewed an award of attorney fees 
arising from the breach of a real estate sales contract, The trial court ordered that the 
defendants pay the full amount of the plaintiffs' attorney fees. Id. at t : io\vc\c:, :K r^ia, 
c . u,. - :' •"• "- «iffu< •• <—r- - .'V: tr. .J :< 'indin^s of fact 
regarding the particular fees billed or the quality of the work done. IcL The Utah Supreme 
Court, after noting that when the evidence of fees presented is insufficient, an award oi fees 
cannot stand, stated that the attorney's affidavit "did not, as it should have, categorized the 
fee request according to the plaintiffs' successful and unsuccessful claims and the opposing 
parties involved in the action." Id at 55. The court also stated that because the fees for 
services related to tort as well as contract claims, "even a cursory look at counsel's affidavit 
reveals counsel's failure to properly categorize the fee request and raises questions about the 
reasonableness of the fees related to the breach of contract claim." Id, Finally, the court 
stated that a plaintiff '"should not have a free ride to assert claims against other defendants 
with the expectation that the target defendant will end up paying all of the attorney's fees,' 
even when those claims factually relate to claims for which the plaintiff may be entitled to 
attorney fees." I d at 56, quoting Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management. Inc.. 645 
P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982). 
Here, as in Foote. Richards* fraud claim should not be permitted a "free ride" on the 
back of his breach claim. Richards' failure to allocate typifies the evidence which the court 
in Foote held was insufficient to support an award of attorney fees. The court stated that 
when a party's "evidentiary submissions in support of a request for attorney fees are 
deficient, so will be the court's evaluation of those fees." Foote. 962 P.2d at 56. Because 
Richards' submissions were insufficient, the trial court's own allocation of his fees should not 
have occurred. However, as opposed to Foote. this Court should not remand to provide 
Richards with a third opportunity to make the allocations which this Court mandated, 
particularly where the billing records make such allocation impossible. The trial court erred 
when it awarded Richards any attorney fees. 
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P O P - ' • 
RICHARDS SHOULD NOT HAVE RECEIVED ATTORNEY 
FEES FOR CALCULATING HIS ATTORNEY FEES. 
In his opening L-riLi . . :11c cro;-- ^ppe ;., oi AM* r ^ ^ , - - • ; M- -• 
have awarded Richards fees for calculating his attorney fees. (Point II, pp. io-LJ} Brown 
maintains that such an award rewards Richards' recalcitrance, especially in light :>f the fact 
that ..a^ Richards allocated :*^ : ^ • .*. :ie snowa na\c, nu substantial fees :?k.u:n\. ;'• 
E ichards in the calci llation process w 01 lid have been unnecessary, and that the calculation 
process was little more than an exercise in futility since Richards did not and cannot make 
the required allocations. In response, Richards embraces Salmon v. Davis County, _!a 
C t App. 1994), without discussing them in any serious fashion. Close examination of these 
cases reveals that they do not support Richards' position. 
some mention here. The reasoning which supported an award of fees for the calculation of 
fees in Salmon did not command a majority of the Utah Supreme Court. See Salmon. 916 
P.,_u a n Salmon. Justice Durham (joined b) Justice Ste s art) conch iided that the stati ite 
in question must be broadly construed to allow an award of attorney fees necessarily incurred 
in litigating to recover fees initially provided by the statute, to prevent rendering such a fee 
shifting statute impotent. !'.-.. i .mi. ^ a -..:•.. 
Durhan < . :• - . perspective and pointed out a significant dissimilarity between the 
case and the "normal contract case." Chief Justice Zimmerman stated: 
1 5 
Justice Durham analogi2ed Salmon's case to typical cases where attorney 
fees incurred on appeal are awarded whenever attorney fees were initially 
authorized by statute or contract. . . . 
However, Salmon could not raise the attorney fee issue in the 
underlying proceedings [in this case] because the County [from which he 
sought attorney fees] was not a party to the underlying criminal actions against 
him. This anomaly sets §63-30a-2 apart from the vast majority of our cases 
which rely on a statutory or contractual provision for attorney fees, where the 
attorney fee issue can be litigated in the same proceeding as the substantive 
right to which this award of fees is attached. 
916 P.2d at 901-02. Justice Zimmerman's reasoning is crucial to an understanding of that 
case and distinguishes Salmon from this case. 
In Salmon, the party from which fees were sought, Davis County, was not a party to 
the underlying litigation which generated the need for fees. And the county exacerbated the 
attorney fees incurred by Salmon when it refused to submit the dispute to arbitration, 
disputed the amount which he claimed, and finally recommended that Salmon file a 
complaint to obtain a judicial ruling on the reasonable fees sought in order to disgorge fees 
from the county. In other words, the county "ran up the bill." 916 P.2d at 892. This alone 
distinguishes the present case from Salmon. Here, it was Richards' failure to allocate fees 
among compensable claims and non-compensable claims which forced the court of appeals 
to vacate the original award of attorney fees to Richards and remand the case for an 
appropriate award of attorney fees taking those three categories into account. The allocation 
then attempted by Richards consumed hundreds of hours1 time, for which Richards 
subsequendy sought, and obtained, partial compensation. By his attorneys' failure to record 
and allocate time properly, it was Richards who "ran up the bill." Brown, unlike the county 
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ldili;..Ji i- • • -ver how much subsequent fees were incurred to calculate fees. 
Brown should not have to pay Richards' fees for attempting to calculate fees. 
('hief justice Zimmerman also addressed the concern of exorbitant fee requests and 
ttrdlt Hru'wT..;, w • v in Niiinon let here, Richards' attorneys, who were 
experienced in complex litigation cases and also seemingly knew they had to allocate their 
time, failed to keep their time records in a fashion that would generate far less effort to 
an attempt to direct attention from, the obvious - failure to make the required allocations. 
Salmon does not address this situation where experienced attorneys utterly fail to 
r<r<<<
 KJ\ •• •- . .. .;- - .* • * ' /rvnsable litigation issi ics. 
Therefore, the Salmon fee-for-fee opinion does not assist Richards' claim and should not be 
read as offering rewards to attorneys who fail to present evidence in support of fee requests. 
iames Constructors ai- • ,i<*- -u •. pp..; t i ..Juul,.1 n l.i in Spt uiu ally, Ru hauls Luis 
to note that recovery of attorney fees in ' ames Constructors was permitted under a contract 
provision peculiar to that case. James Constructors. 888 P.2d at 668, 674. The contract 
provision under which Richards claimed ice: n: *:. .a , ncarr a.- spcunc. 
Perhaps the most convincing argument for why Richards should not receive fees for 
calculating fees is found in Richards' own reply/response brief. On page 1, Richards states 
"After a significant expenditure of time a.;J i.auir. :^aurd- submitted voluminous evidence 
. . . ." Wh* • • . : . M : • . • • * . — .< - , . n 
the lawyers had kept 'time records in accord w-th I :ah ;-. \^.\ taring to 1977, the 
"significant expenditure of time and funds" uouiu haw i-a'n unnecessary. Stubbs v. 
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Hemmert. 567 P.2d 168, 171 (Utah 1977); See also Trayner v. Cushing. 688 P.2d 856, 858 
(Utah 1984). Brown should not be required to pay for the admitted refusal of Richards' 
attorneys to follow the law which they said they knew. The trial court should not have 
awarded Richards fees for the expensive, unnecessary and unresponsive process by which he 
calculated his fees. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE AWARDED 
PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST TO RICHARDS ON ATTORNEY FEES. 
On the cross-appeal, Brown argued that Richards should not have been awarded 
interest on the award of attorney fees.7 Both sides agree that resolution of this issue depends 
on the proper application of Mason v. Western Mortgage Loan Corp.. 754 P.2d 984 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) and Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet. 876 P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), to 
Richards' fee judgment in this case, which was vacated because the trial court's findings were 
inadequate. The entire amount of Richards' fees were before the trial court on remand, 
dependant upon his supporting evidence. This Court's prior decision to vacate Richards' fee 
award constitutes a complete abandonment of that award. Brown's first brief points out that 
since the award was vacated, not modified, any fees awarded to Richards must bear interest 
"from the date of entry of such new judgment." Mason. 754 P.2d at 986, quoting Stockton 
7
 As noted in Brown's brief, confusion exists concerning whether the interest awarded 
was pre-judgment or post-judgment interest. Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 24 n. 
5. Brown argued that neither pre-or post-judgment interest was appropriate. I d at 23-27. 
Richards responds only on post-judgment interest, apparently conceding that any award of 
pre-judgment interest would be reversible error. 
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1 heate; .
 T i:.^. ,. i\iie::u, . ' J ' . i . -o]l( >\\t d ir. liailev.-
Allen. 876 P.2d at 427. 
Bailey-Allen and Mason stand for the proposi t ion that in any case which the appellate 
c 3i i i:t re t:i lands t :> th * trial :• :)i :i it: I: j i ldgment interest dates : t ll \ fron I tl: le ei itnr of the neu 
judgment . While Mason cited a general rule from a California case, Stockton, which 
emphasized the distinction between a modification and a reversal, Mason 's holding involved 
a M L ; * .- : . : • : , ; : : - . : • - ' • : ; • *• : . • , 
the original judgment . Stockton's discussion of its rule for modifications can be described 
as merely dicta. 360 P.2d at nC 'Ca1 1°MN Because this Cour t vacated the award of 
af t u r t l e s l e i ' h iu K U I M J J N n i i t l ••:•: * . *.. u * ' :• 
Brown. 840 P.2d at 156, the amount of the award was unascertainable until a new sum was 
entered in the trial court. Bailey-Allen seems to require that judgment interest be entered 
from the date of the new judgment whenever the trial IOUJM must lake evidence t<» teat It a 
decision following remand. 876 P.2d at 426. 
If this Court finds it necessary to classify its prior decision as a reversal or a 
modification, it shou. j IOUK ;O other jurisdictions to determine whether to take a moK :t .«r:iia-
approach or \;i hether t :» exam ine the nati ire and the effect of the decision. For example, in 
Miller v. TransFlorida Bank. 656 So.2d 1 >64, 1366-67 (Fla. Dist App. lr '05), the court held 
that post-judgment interest on attorney r c o oiiould not accrue from the Uare or the original 
tJL< • • • • • • • : * . • \ ' •/ •• . - f x . - J . • • . . 
at torney fees because the trial court had used a contingency risk multiplier in comput ing the 
a m o u n t of fees and remanded to the trial court to consider the reasonableness ui hours 
claimed by the attorney. IdL at 1365. In reaching its subsequent decision the court relied 
heavily on the language of the appellate court which stated "The judgment as to attorney fees 
is reversed" rather than analyzing the effect of the decision which was only to reduce the 
award. Id at 1366. 
Similarly, the trend in this jurisdiction, as set by Bailey-Allen, is that any reversal such 
as in this case which could result in no fees at all being awarded is an abandonment of the 
initial judgment, which means that any interest on a subsequent judgment should run only 
from the date of that judgment, not the date of the original judgment. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT DETERMINED 
THAT POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST CARRIES THE INTEREST RATE 
OF THE OLD STATUTE RATHER THAN THE NEW STATUTE. 
On the cross-appeal Brown argued that the trial applied the wrong interest rate to the 
judgments. The trial court should have applied the interest rate statute as modified by the 
legislature during the pendency of the proceedings rather than the old interest rate statute in 
effect at the time the case started. Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 27-29. Richards 
responds by relying on his interpretation of the federal statute in Kaiser Aluminum v. 
Bonjorno. 494 U.S. 827 (1990). 
As Brown pointed out in his initial brief (p.27-29), the Utah statute differs in a 
significant way from the federal statute interpreted in Kaiser Aluminum. Richards does not 
address these differences. Kaiser Aluminum was based on a 1982 change in the federal 
judgment interest statute, 28 USC §1961, which provided that the interest rate is calculated 
from the date of entry of the judgment. However, the Utah statute does not refer to the 
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"
 J< ' ' i*-r * * «M<)O. i. .liffercnt; m the respective 
statutes is critical and distinguishes this case from Kaiser Aluminum. 
By omitting reference to date u; cntr\. IIK • ..... legislature intended judgments bear 
thi -MI ' i • i . - • '[ . c ff. --^ v J . > "amendment and, 
as provided in the statute, on the first of each year, Utah Code Ann., §15-1-4(2). 
Richards also relies on i tan K ,-^dc Ann., §(nS > j , whi^n provides that no part of the 
"revised stufuH'i." is 'vinui, tiw unless c^-Nprcs^  l\ dtrlarul This provision ,\« M »II I I 'nr 
application if Brown were asking the court to apply the new statute retroactively. However, 
even a cursory examination of Brown's brief discloses that Brown is merely asking that the 
statx ite be gi , c 1:1 effe ct as : f effecti x e date th z interest rate changii ig sach } • : ar. 1: 1 : t 
retroactively, in Ucz, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that statutes should be given 
effect immediately. In Madsen v. BorthicL 769 P.2d 245, 252 n, 11 1T< h 1988), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that ordinarily, ~ -. J presumption [is] that an aiiie ndmei it is intended 
to change existing legal rights." See also Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co. 956 P.2d 257, 
261 (Utah 1998); Visitor Info. Ctr. v. Tax Comm?n.. 930 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1997), In 
other words, the change in the interest rate statute sn-uk; ....,^ been applied fa) tl le trial 
c '.:• . ffi•,::-.! d r f the amendment to effectuate the legislature's purpose to 
change existing legal rights. The trial court should have awarded interest on the non-contract 
awards at \1 *- trom the December .... V)v: judgment through Ma\ ... 1 \ ;;^.i at an 
ii u-u *" * ; ~ " 'HM'. 1li f - ti)i] ' 
9.22% for 1995, then 7.35% from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 1996, then 7.45°/0 from 
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January 1, 1997 to the date of judgment, when the offset in Brown's favor would accrue 
contract interest. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT 
INTEREST ON THE BREACH OF WARRANTY DAMAGES. 
In his first brief Brown maintained that the trial court committed reversible error 
when it awarded pre-judgment interest on the breach of warranty damages. Those damages 
were not calculable with mathematical certainty until they were determined by the jury. 
Brown also argued that Richards was not entitled to pre-judgment interest because it was not 
awarded in the October 1990 judgment and he did not appeal the issue. 
Richards' response demonstrates the validity of Brown's position. First, Richards 
claims that damages were precisely ascertainable. However, he admits "the jury was 
instructed to award damages based on comparison of the value of the assets as received and 
as warranted" and that ". . .there was a factual dispute about those values . . .." Richards' 
Reply/Response Brief at 22-23. Richards thus concedes that the damages could not be fixed 
until the jury determined the values. Therefore, warranty damages plainly were not calculable 
with any degree of certainty, much less the mathematical precision required by the case law, 
until the jury fixed the values. See, e ^ , Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991). 
Therefore, pre-judgment interest should not have been awarded. 
Richards next claims that he could not appeal the trial court's initial decision to deny 
pre-judgment interest because the trial court denied him any damages for breach of warranty. 
Richards' Reply/Response Brief at 23. What Richards does not explain is how the court's 
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ruling on damages foreclosed him from appealing the interest issue. Richards points to no 
case which permits a party to preserve an issue for appeal which has been previously waived. 
In fact, permitting such a rule would establish a dangerous precedent because cases would 
never reach a resolution, they would instead undergo round after round of endless appeals. 
Finally, Richards asks this Court to bypass the established case law on pre-judgment 
interest and the facts of this case and give him prejudgment interest to prevent "a rapacious 
result." Brown can hardly be characteri2ed as a greedy plunderer for pointing out the trial 
court's error and Richards' acquiescence. This Court should decline Richards' invitation to 
ignore the law and the facts because he has given this Court neither a legal or factual basis 
for such action. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE OFFSET THE JUDGMENT 
SO THAT ONLY ONE NET JUDGMENT RESULTED. 
Brown argued that the trial court should have combined the various judgments in this 
case into one net award with one interest rate. In response, Richards argues that Brown did 
not preserve this error for appeal. 
Before the trial court first ruled on fees after remand, Brown reminded the trial court 
of the interest differential that continued to grow in Richards1 favor until a judgment was 
entered, thus preserving this issue. (R. 5542) When the court first ruled, it instructed Brown's 
attorneys to factor all the rulings into the "former judgment," uncertain as to who would owe 
who. (R. 5554) That October, 1990 judgment contained no offset provision with one 
resulting interest rate, rather the award for each claim, with its attendant interest, stands on 
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its own. (R.4072-4102) Thus the result of the interest awards in the current judgment is the 
same as the original judgment, as the trial court directed. 
Richards also argues that Brown may not object to a judgment which he prepared and 
that the variety of interest rates prevented this judgment from being unified into a single 
judgment with one interest rate. Richards' argument ignores the fact that Brown was again 
directed by the trial court to reduce its minute entry into judgment form. (R. 5712) 
Obviously, the trial court had decided this issue at this point and would hear nothing further 
on it. With respect to the multiplicity of interest rates, nothing prevented the trial court from 
entering one net judgment, which in fact it did. (R. 5883) But the trial court failed to award 
interest on that net result at one interest rate. This seemed to be the direction of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Hansen v. Kohler. 550 P.2d 186, 198 (Utah 1976) and should be the 
direction of this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this brief and Brown's opening brief on the cross-appeal, 
Brown requests that this Court: (1) vacate the award of attorney fees to Richards, (2) vacate 
the award of attorney fees for calculating fees, (3) vacate the award of interest on the 
attorney fees, (4) reverse the trial court's judgment that interest carry the applicable rate of 
interest in effect at the time of the judgment, (5) vacate the award of pre-judgment interest 
on the breach of warranty claim, (6) reverse the trial court's decision that the judgments 
should not offset, with multiple interest notes, and (7) award Brown attorney fees for this 
appeal. Brown requests that the case be remanded for entry of appropriate orders. 
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On the issues raised by Richards, Brown requests that this Court: (1) if it rules against 
the first issue raised by Brown, affirm the trial court's ruling on the amount of attorney fees 
awarded to Richards, (2) deny Richards any fees for this appeal, (3) affirm the trial court's 
award of costs to Richards, and (4) affirm the trial court's award of attorney fees to Brown 
on the rescission claim. 
DATED this 2nd day of December, 1998. 
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and Cross-Appellants 
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